In recent decades there has been growing concern about the effects of anthropogenic climate change, or global warming. Anthropogenic, refers to changes in our climate that are directly associated with the production of greenhouse gases emitted from human activities. Since 1750, about two thirds of anthropogenic climate change carbon dioxide emissions have come from fossil fuel burning associated with productive activities. Carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide and methane, the most potent of the greenhouse gases, are at higher levels than we’ve seen in over 650,000 years. These gases trap heat much like a greenhouse and cause the Earth to rise in temperature, as the atmosphere retain more heat from the sun. This effect has many negative consequences including, but not limited to, droughts, heavier rainfall, increasing the intensity of extreme weather patterns, melting glaciers and rising sea levels. These all can have profound effects on the livelihoods of humans and non-human life (Global Greenhouse Warming, n.d.; NRDC, n.d.). Climate change presents a variety of social justice problems that range from food insecurity to human health problems, among others. These problems tend to affect those that are impoverished the most. For the social justice problems that climate change presents, we must identify obligations we may have to mitigate, or lessen, the effects of climate change.
In addition to general concern about the effects of climate change, there have also been questions raised about how we might best address the issues associated with climate change. One basic ethical question is: What should be done about anthropogenic climate change, and who should do it? There is evidence that suggests climate change is already having devastating impacts on both human and non-human life. There is also evidence to suggest that continued high rates of greenhouse gas emission will bring about more destruction and harms in future years. While this question may seem “simple”, it is not. Attempting to address this question, leads to additional complicated questions of global and intergenerational justice. It brings up questions about our obligations towards other humans and also brings up questions about our obligations towards non-human nature. Do some nations, especially those that have emitted larger quantities of greenhouse gases, have an obligation to undergo more of the “costs” of climate change mitigation and adaptation than other countries? As we consider actions to mitigate climate change, how should we weigh the harms and benefits to future generations in relation to individuals today (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2018)?
In this paper, I will be exploring some of the obligations that well-off countries might owe to those in less well-off countries, with regard to climate change mitigation and adaptation. It is my belief that more well-off countries, such as the United States, have more capabilities in regards to mitigating climate change as they have more of a means to do so. In addition to this, these nations may be the most responsible for the issues resulting from anthropogenic climate change due to high levels of development and industrialization. Thus, these well-off countries have an obligation to lessen climate change and help those in less well-off countries develop sustainably and adapt accordingly.
Darrel Moellendorf states that “everyone has a reason to avoid involuntary poverty”. If the costs of risk reduction must be put on someone, then it is unreasonable for the poor to bear these costs if it perpetuates their poverty. The risks associated with energy policies should not increase poverty or delay its eradication. Since it is not feasible for everyone to avoid the costs associated with climate change, a principle assigning these costs to those more well-off is equitable. He states that this applies to both the present and future global poor (Moellendorf, 22). Moellendorf’s anti poverty principle, or APP, can be defined as:
Policies and institutions should not impose any costs of climate change policy (such as mitigation and adaptation) on the global poor, of the present or future generations, when those costs make the prospects for poverty eradication worse than they would be absent them, if there are alternative policies that would prevent the poor from assuming those costs (Moellendorf, 22).
The general idea, here, is that we have good reasons to incorporate the idea of “not prolonging poverty” as a constraint on climate change policy. This, of course, is based on the assumption that involuntary poverty is a bad thing. Ultimately, we should aim for a principle that is equitable and that is based on the respect for human dignity (Moellendorf, 21-22).
Moellendorf does not present a way to best understand the “poor” or the least well-off. We can assume that “poor” people or those least well-off are individuals that live on lower incomes, in areas that may lack development or basic services. Additionally, these individuals may not have the means to live comfortably. In contrast, those individuals who are well-off generally are not “lacking” in anything, live in areas that are more developed and have the means to live comfortably without many economic anxieties.
Climate change will have significant costs for future generations and the poor will be even more vulnerable. It is unrealistic to think that no future costs will be paid by the global poor, but we can do a few things to provide them with protection. Well-off nations can assume some of the costs through mitigation policies and investments in infrastructure for adaptation. We can also make sure that the poor at present do not suffer more as a result of mitigation and adaptation efforts. Additionally not increasing or prolonging poverty, we can ensure that the starting point of future generations is not as bad as it could be (Moellendorf, 22).
Climate change mitigation may require those that are well-off to forego certain benefits now to avoid future risks or harms. This obligation would also serve to protect those least well-off now and in the future. We could take this to mean that those in well-off countries transition to renewable energy sources to perform their productive, developmental or industrial activities. This could also mean a limit could be placed on their production of goods or on further development. By transitioning to renewable energy sources or by limiting production and development, well-off countries would lessen their emissions and play a role in mitigating harm to those affected most by climate change, the global poor. These factors would also promote better a livelihood with regards to future generations.
If we utilize the idea of “not prolonging poverty” in reference to climate change mitigation and adaptation, we see a different story. Moellendorf explains an important norm for the morality of climate change policy agreed upon by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, or UNFCCC. This norm is the “right to sustainable development”(Moellendorf, 123). As defined by the UNFCCC:
The Parties have a right to, and should, promote sustainable development. Policies and measures to protect the climate system against human-induced change should be appropriate for the specific conditions of each Party and should be integrated with national development programmes, taking into account that economic development is essential for adopting measures to address climate change (Moellendorf, 123).
This right to sustainable development, as outlined by the UNFCCC, is explained as the liberty for least-developed, or less well-off countries, and those developing nations to pursue energy-intensive development and not be held to the same financial burdens to mitigate that highly developed, or well-off countries, are (Moellendorf, 124).
Taking the APP into account, we can understand that by promoting sustainable development, we would be helping those individuals in less well-off countries out of poverty. This is because, although it licenses energy-intensive economic growth, this same growth is poverty-eradicating. All countries, especially those that are developing, need access to resources that would help them achieve sustainable social and economic development. In order for this goal to be achieved, these countries must be able to grow their energy consumption in a sustainable manner (Moellendorf, 126).
Well-off countries ought to cooperate with less well-off countries to promote an open economic or trade system that would put those in developing countries in a better position to help address issues of climate change. More developed countries can offer assistance in terms of how to develop in a sustainable manner by taking into account their own shortcomings in relation to anthropogenic climate change. In addition to this, promoting human development in general would lead to improvements in health and education for those nations. By helping or “allowing” countries to develop, we can lift them out of poverty. We can expand the freedoms of those in less well-off nations.
With higher-income, more industrialized nations first transitioning to renewable energy sources or limiting their productive activities, greenhouse gas emissions would be lessened. Less well-off countries would then be able to industrialize and flourish economically which could allow them to be involved in addressing the issues of climate change. Well-off countries may also have the obligation to help less well-off countries adopt energy efficient technologies to mitigate climate change effects in the future. These industrialized countries might also provide resources to help those most vulnerable to climate change adapt and recover from the current harms of climate change.
According to John Rawls, justice is the first virtue of social institutions and the basic structure of a society (Rawls, 3). The justice of a social scheme depends on how fundamental rights and duties are assigned and on the economic opportunities and social conditions in the various sectors of society (Rawls, 7). Rawls develops the principles of justice through the use of what he calls the original position. In this thought experiment, everyone decides principles of justice behind a veil of ignorance. This veil makes individuals ignorant to information and details about themselves so that they may not adjust principles of justice to suit their own needs and desires. The veil also leads to ignorance about the identifiers, specifications or preferences of others. To identify principles of justice that would lead to basic rights and social cooperation, we are tasked with imagining choices being made by representatives who are blind to certain “social identifiers”. They do not know if individuals are rich or poor, black or white, smart or dumb, strong or feeble and so on. From his original position, Rawls argues that representatives would select principles of justice that would maximize liberties and lead to equality, even for those members that are the least well off (Rawls, 11-19). This position is significant for this issue, as, he believes it would lead to justice and equality for all.
Under the veil of ignorance, we could see that current generations have the obligation to formulate principles of justice that may be neutral. These principles would not give excessive advantages or disadvantages to nations based on climate change. This is because such individuals formulating principles of justice are incapable of knowing whether or not they would be a part of the disadvantaged group. In addition to this, Rawls’ idea of “natural” abilities might be useful in helping to address the question of whether individuals who have historically benefitted from the production of greenhouse gases ought to continue to do so even if it may place unnecessary burdens on future generations from anthropogenic climate change.
If nations have benefited as a result of something “that has made their development possible”, and this “did not contribute to the advantages of others”, then Rawls would consider it an “unjust benefit” (Rawls, 89; Callaghan, 2017). The benefits resulting are unjust because this distribution of benefits would not have been selected under the veil of ignorance. Rawls makes the claim that “we do not deserve our place in the distribution of native endowments, any more than we deserve our initial starting place in society” (Rawls, 89). Taking this into account, Rawls might argue that well-off nations do not deserve further economic and developmental benefits they have previously enjoyed as a result of global warming inducing emissions, because these benefits have not contributed to the advantages of other, less well-off, countries (Callaghan, 2017). Instead, nations that are better off, have polluted and generally made the least well-off nations dilapidated or, perhaps, uninhabitable in future years. This, of course, does not prove advantageous to the least well-off countries. An obligation for well-off countries, taking this into account, could be to not continue to utilize fossil fuels to meet their productive or developmental goals. They could, instead, use renewable energy sources to achieve the same results and economic benefits, or they could limit their own production or development to mitigate harms resulting from climate change.
Utilizing the difference principle, Rawls argues that the distribution in society should be arranged so that is has the greatest benefit to the least well-off persons. He also argues that individuals in this society are bound to each other by duties and responsibilities to one another. In addition to this, Rawls claims that persons in different generations also have duties and obligations to one another. To ignore one’s obligation to other generations is unjust. In the case of climate change, it is unjust not to take action. The decision of current generations to not curb their emissions would be made in acknowledgment of how this may compromise the welfare of or place unnecessary burdens on future generations (Rawls, 256-257; Callaghan, 2017). As is the case, well-off countries have the obligation to not ignore the effects their actions may have on the least well-off nations. Well-off countries also have the obligation to curb their own emissions to help mitigate climate change.
According to John Stuart Mill and the general concept of utilitarianism, the rightness of an action is determined by whether it brings about the best overall consequences. With act utilitarianism specifically, “actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness” (Mill, 7). Instead of looking at the consequences of specific acts, rule utilitarianism decides the rightness of acts by finding the value of the consequences of following a particular rule (Mill, 22-24). The greatest good for the greatest number promotes the most happiness in a society. Unfortunately, many people are not “happy” and are living in unsatisfactory conditions as a result of climate change. Those most vulnerable, the global poor, are greatly impacted by the many negative effects resulting from the warming of the planet. Floods and droughts have destroyed livelihoods and this leaves people without food, water or adequate shelter. Simply put, climate change is not promoting the Greatest Happiness Principle that utilitarianism wishes to promote and it is not benefitting a large number of humankind. Instead, climate change is diminishing happiness and the quality of many livelihoods. The irresponsibility and the inaction on the parts of well-off countries in regards to climate change is detrimental to those societies that are already struggling. It is my understanding that Mill would claim that climate change is not in the interest of the greatest good. I believe he would also condemn the inaction of well-off countries in reference to climate change and would oblige them to take action to promote the welfare and happiness of all, especially those that are less well-off. Mill might also oblige individuals to mitigate and adapt and to help others to do so. These actions are those that would promote the greatest happiness and lead to the best overall consequences.
The risks and concerns resulting from climate change affect highly developed, as well as nations that are less developed. Poorer individuals in less well-off countries are especially vulnerable as they have little to no means of adapting to climate change, investing in adaptation policies, protect themselves from its harms (Moellendorf, 157). Future generations have good reasons to avoid the risks of climate change, just as current generations have reasons to avoid the harms resulting from climate change. It is up to the current generation, however, to change our greenhouse gas emissions policies and to stabilize our atmosphere and climate.
Exploring perspectives of Moellendorf, Rawls and Mill to address the obligations well-off countries might have towards less well-off countries, I have come to a variety of conclusions. Well-off nations can assume some of the costs through mitigation policies and investments into infrastructure for adaption. Well-off nations can also make sure that the poor at present do not suffer more as a result of mitigation and adaptation efforts. More developed and industrialized nations have an obligation to lessen climate change, as they have more of a means to do so and are more responsible due to their historical use of fossil fuels for development and industrialization. These nations also have an obligation to help those in less well-off countries develop sustainably, adapt accordingly and adopt energy efficient technologies to mitigate climate change effects in the future. Well-off countries can offer assistance in terms of how to develop in a sustainable manner by taking in to account their own shortcomings in relation to anthropogenic climate change. These countries might also provide resources to help those countries most vulnerable to climate change recover from the current harms of climate change. In addition to this, high-income, more industrialized nations can work to transition to renewable energy sources and perhaps limit their productive activities. In both cases, greenhouse gas emissions will be lessened and would promote the flourishing of humankind.
References
“Anthropogenic Climate Change.” Global Greenhouse Warming, http://www.global-greenhouse-warming.com/anthropogenic-climate-change.html. Accessed 10 Dec. 2018.
Callaghan, Cash. “The Ethics of Climate Change.” Confluence, NYU Gallatin, 2017, confluence.gallatin.nyu.edu/context/interdisciplinary-seminar/the-ethics-of-climate-change. Accessed 11 Dec. 2018.
“Climate Science (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 11 May 2018, plato.stanford.edu/entries/climate-science/. Accessed 10 Dec. 2018.
“Global Warming 101.” NRDC, http://www.nrdc.org/stories/global-warming-101#weather. Accessed 10 Dec. 2018.
Mill, John S. Utilitarianism and the 1868 Speech on Capital Punishment. 2nd ed., Hackett Publishing Company Inc., 2001.
Moellendorf, Darrel. The Moral Challenge of Dangerous Climate Change: Values, Poverty and Policy. Cambridge University Press, 2014.
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press, 1971.
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